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acknowledged.1 Introduction
A fair division problem arises when two or more agents are called to divide a
good over which they claim equal rights. The oldest known examples include
Abraham and Lot arguing over land division (Genesis 13), and Prometheus
and Zeus disputing a pile of meat (Hesiod's Theogony). A recent dramatic
example is the carving of Bosnia and Herzegovina as an independent entity
within the Dayton Accords that put an end to a 3-year civil war over the
spoils of the former Republic of Yugoslavia.
There are several situations where the solution of a fair division problem
cannot call on instruments like prices, monetary compensations, or auctions.
This may be due to liquidity constraints; or to the psychological diculty of
bringing a dispute down to monetary evaluations; or to political constraints,
as in the case of Bosnia and Herzegovina; or to the presence of judicially
enforceable rights | such as under U.S. law | \to seek partition in kind,
or physical division, of jointly owned land"; see Miceli and Sirmans (2000).
This paper studies the problem of fair division when the dispute must
be resolved using division in kind. We are interested in devising a proce-
dure that can help the parties to reach an outcome that is both fair and
ecient. We assume that the disputed object is a single innitely divisi-
ble good over which agents have heterogeneous preferences and that there
are no consumption externalities. The canonical example is the division
of a cake, when agents have dierent (additive) preferences over dierent
slices; see Steinhaus (1948). A less obvious example is the case of a nite
(or countable) number of homogeneous innitely divisible goods, where the
aggregate endowment is viewed as the single heterogeneous good at stake;
see Chambers (2005, Section 5).
There are two main ordinal concepts in the fair division literature. The
rst is the envy-free principle which states that each party should (weakly)
prefers its share to anyone else's. This was proposed by Gamow and Stern
(1958, pp. 117{119), but became widely known after Foley (1967). Any
ecient envy-free allocation is ex post stable because no one desires to ex-
change what he received with anyone else's share. However, this solution
concept suers from a multiplicity problem that makes it less satisfactory
from an ex-ante, or procedural, point of view. There are in general many
ecient envy-free allocations, and each of them provides dierent payos
to the agents. Therefore, they are likely to disagree on how to select one
among these allocations. The divide-and-choose mechanism under complete
information, for instance, selects among all the ecient envy-free allocations
the division that maximizes the payo to the divider | so conict is likely
to shift over how the divider is chosen.
An alternative normative concept is the egalitarian equivalent criterion
which states that each party should be indierent between getting his share
and some reference bundle, identical for all agents. This was introduced by
1Pazner and Schmeidler (1978) to overcome the problem that ecient no-envy
allocation may not exist at all for economies with non-convex preferences
or with production. As dierent reference bundles lead to dierent shares,
the multiplicity problem over ecient and egalitarian equivalent allocations
resurfaces in the choice of the reference bundle. Pazner and Schmeidler
(1978) suggests circumventing the diculty by focusing only on those ref-
erence bundles that are proportional to the total endowment. (Assuming
eciency, this leads to a unique selection.) Sprumont and Zhou (1999) ax-
iomatizes this \Pazner-Schmeidler" rule for large exchange economies with
convex preferences where the endowment is a nite number of homogeneous
innitely divisible goods.
It is not immediately obvious how to extend the \Pazner{Schmeidler"
rule when the endowment is a single heterogeneous good. Consider the
division of a contested cake among a group of people who have equal claims
on it. The agents may evaluate the value of a piece of the cake along dierent
attributes: its crust, its lling, its weight, the number of strawberries on it,
and so on. The challenge is how to make sure that all relevant attributes
are proportionally represented in the reference bundle. Moreover, even if the
parties themselves agree that a criterion should be represented whenever an
agent cares about it, is there a way to elicit this strategic information from
each party?
We answer these questions under the assumption that each agent can
partition the disputed cake into a nite (or countable) number of parcels
that he (but not necessarily the other parties) views as homogeneous. The
intuition is the following. Each agent divides the cake in as many parcels
as he likes. Equally sized morsels from the same parcel carry the same util-
ity to the agent, so that each parcel is a homogeneous good for the agent.
Note that equally sized morsels from two dierent parcels may carry dif-
ferent utility to him; and, similarly, equally sized morsels from an agent's
parcel may give dierent utilities to another agent. Consider now the com-
mon renement of all the agents' partitions. Each parcel in this new and
ner partition is a homogeneous good for each party. This brings us back to
the standard setting for the Pazner-Schmeidler rule. Hence, we choose the
reference bundle among those that are proportional to this common rene-
ment. Under eciency, the selection of the reference bundle to dene the
egalitarian equivalent allocation is again unique.
Clearly, in the search for a procedure to implement the ecient egal-
itarian equivalent allocation with respect to this special reference bundle,
we also need to overcome the diculty of devising a game in which each
agent reveals his own partition of the cake. Lying over one's partition may
lead to a dierent reference bundle and hence to a better share for the liar.
We provide a simple procedure which implements the desired outcome as a
subgame-perfect equilibrium, under the assumption that agents have com-
plete information about their preferences. The procedure is simple in the
2sense of Thomson (2005). It generalizes a mechanism suggested in Crawford
(1979) and ameliorated in Demange (1984). Their mechanism derives an ef-
cient egalitarian equivalent allocation for a nite collection of homogenous
goods. Our procedure must also simultaneously discover the right way to
partition the heterogeneous good.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes our model, which
is a standard version of the classical setup for cake division problems. Sec-
tion 3 proves the existence of ecient egalitarian equivalent allocations for
a single heterogeneous good using only measure-theoretic assumptions; the
only other existence result we are aware of is more general in scope but
requires additional topological assumptions; see Berliant et alii (1992). Sec-
tion 4 describes the assumptions that dene the economic environment over
which our procedure can be applied. Section 5 states the implementation
result. Section 6 contains a brief closing remark. Long proofs are relegated
to the appendix.
2 The model
Our model is an abstraction of the classical problem where a cake (or a piece
of land) must be allocated among several agents. There is a measurable
space (
;F), where 
 is the object to be divided among the n agents and
F is a -algebra over 
. We say that an element of F is a parcel and that
an F-measurable subset of a parcel is a morsel, which is a nicer term than
\subparcel". Any subset of 
 mentioned in the following is an element of
F, and hence a parcel.
For n  2, let N = f1;2;:::;ng be the (nite) set of agents. Agents
have preferences over parcels of 
. Each agent i is endowed with a utility
function ui : F ! R+ that is a nonatomic probability measure on F. (Since
preferences are invariant up to a positive rescaling of the utility function,
ui(
) = 1 is only a normalization.) A measure ui is nonatomic if, for each
parcel A and each x in (0;u(A)), there exists another parcel B  A such
that ui(B) = x. Hence, the range of each ui is the (convex) interval [0;1].
A utility function u over parcels is absolutely continuous with respect to
another measure  over F if (A) = 0 implies u(A) = 0 for any parcel A.
Clearly, any utility function ui is absolutely continuous with respect to the
measure  =
Pn
i=1 ui. We make the assumption that the utility functions
are mutually absolutely continuous; that is, if ui(A) = 0 for some parcel
A, then uj(A) = 0 for any agent j. Since agents agree on the null parcels,
we say that a parcel has zero (or positive) measure without specifying a
measure.
An allocation X = (x1;:::;xn) is a partition of 
 in n parcels, where xi is
the parcel assigned to agent i in N. An allocation X is ecient (or weakly
ecient, respectively) if there exists no other allocation Y = (y1;:::;yn)
3such that ui(yi)  ui(xi) for all i, with the strict inequality holding for some
i (or ui(yi) > ui(xi) for all i). Any ecient allocation is also weakly ecient.
The converse is true under our assumption that agents have preferences that
are mutually absolutely continuous; see Akin (1995, Lemma 9).
There are several criteria to evaluate the fairness of an allocation. For
instance, an allocation X is proportional if ui(xi)  (1=n) for all i; and
it is equitable if ui(xi) = uj(xj) for all i and j. These two notions of
fairness hinge on the demanding assumption that interpersonal preferences
are comparable. The main fairness criteria based on ordinal preferences are
two. An allocation X is envy-free if ui(xi)  ui(xj) for all i and j, and it
is egalitarian equivalent (for short, EE) if there exists a reference parcel A
such that ui(xi) = ui(A) for all i. Any envy-free allocation is proportional,
but the converse is true only if n = 2.
Under our setup, the following existence results are known. Dubins and
Spanier (1961) proves the existence of ecient and proportional allocations
for preferences which may not be mutually absolutely continuous. It notes
that adding this latter assumption ensures that all ecient allocations are
equitable. Maccheroni and Marinacci (2003) gives sucient conditions to
extend the existence result for proportional allocations when the utility func-
tions are concave capacities. Weller (1985) proves the existence of weakly
ecient and envy-free allocations; eciency follows immediately under mu-
tual absolute continuity.
More existence results are known under related setups, which addition-
ally assume that 
 is a subset of Rk. For instance, Stromquist (1980) proves
the existence of envy-free allocations for a planar cake using a larger class
of preferences, but restricting the set of admissible partitions. Berliant et
alii (1992) has several results. It gives a stronger version of Weller's (1985)
result assuming that the utility functions are absolutely continuous with re-
spect to the Lebesgue measure. And it proves the existence of ecient and
egalitarian equivalent allocations for a general class of preferences that must
however be continuous in a complicated topology described in Berliant and
Dunz (2004).
3 Existence of ecient EE partitions
This section proves the existence of ecient and egalitarian equivalent al-
locations in our setup. Contrary to Berliant et alii (1992), we make no
topological assumptions so that the proof does not rely on the structure of
Rk.
We need a few denitions. Let u = (u1;:::;un) be the vector of the n
agents' utility functions on the measurable space (
;F). The set R(u) =
fu(A) : A 2 Fg in Rn is the range of u. The range of u spans the vector
of utilities that the agents can achieve if they are all given the same par-
4cel. By assumption, each ui is a nonatomic probability measure. Then, by
Lyapunov's convexity theorem, R(u) is a compact and convex subset of Rn.
Let  be the set of all n-partitions of 
. The set RP(u) = f(u1(x1);:::;
un(xn)) : X 2 g in Rn is the partition range of u. The partition range
is sometimes called the Individual Pieces Set; see Barbanel (2005). The
partition range of u spans the vector of utilities that the agents can achieve
by dividing up the cake according to some allocation. Dvoretzky et alii
(1951) derives from Lyapunov's convexity theorem a more general result,
which implies that the partition range is also a compact and convex subset
of Rn.
We also call on the following three lemmata, which assume that u is
a (nite) vector of nonatomic probability measures. The rst two results
correspond to Corollary 1.1 and Lemma 5.3 in Dubins and Spanier (1961),
respectively. They do not require preferences that are mutually absolutely
continuous.
Lemma 1 Given an integer k and positive weights 1;:::;k with
P
j j =
1, there exists a k-partition X = (x1;:::;xk) such that ui(xj) = j for all
i = 1;:::;n and j = 1;:::;k.
For k = n and j = 1=n for all j, this implies that the partition range of u
always contains the point (1=n;:::;1=n). The next lemma, instead, concerns
the range of u and implies that it always contains the whole diagonal.
Lemma 2 For any t in [0;1] there exists a parcel At such that ui(At) = t
for each i.
Our last lemma characterize ecient allocations when preference are mu-
tually absolutely continuous; see Barbanel and Zwicker (1997, Theorem 1).
Section 7C in Barbanel (2005) discusses the case where mutual absolute
continuity does not hold.
Lemma 3 If preferences are mutually absolutely continuous, an allocation
is ecient if and only if it maximizes a convex combination of the utility
functions.
The following is the main result in this section.
Theorem 1 There exists at least one allocation which is ecient and egal-
itarian equivalent.
Proof: Consider the set RP(u). If the vector 1 = (1;:::;1) belongs to
RP(u), there exists an allocation such that every agent has utility 1 = ui(
).
Clearly, this allocation is ecient and egalitarian equivalent with respect to
the reference parcel 
.
5So, assume that the vector 1 is not in RP(u). For any t in [0;1], let
t = (t;:::;t). By Lemma 1, RP(u) contains 1=n and so it is not empty. By
compactness of RP(u), the continuous functionf(t) = t attains a maximum
t < 1. The vector t is in RP(u), so there exists some allocation X such
that ui(x
i) = t for each i. By Lemma 2, there exists some parcel A such
that ui(A) = t and thus X is an egalitarian equivalent allocation with
respect to the reference parcel A.
Moreover, since t is also a boundary point of the convex set RP(u),
there is a supporting hyperplane for RP(u) going through t. Thus, for some








for any u in RP(u) and hence by Lemma 3 X is also ecient. 2
4 An economic environment for EE allocations
The existence result in Theorem 1 is not constructive. In other words, it
does not tell us how to nd X. It does not even try and ask agents if they
know what X should be. This leads naturally to the question of designing
a procedure that generates an ecient and egalitarian equivalent allocation.
Crawford (1979) provides a solution to this problem when there is a nite
number of perfectly divisible homogeneous goods, under the assumption
that there is complete information about agents' (continuous and strongly
monotonic) preferences. Given a numeraire bundle x that is desirable for
all agents, each agent bids a price for the right to propose the allocation.
If everybody accepts the winner's proposal, this is carried out. If an agent
refuses the proposal, the nal allocation is derived from the equal share rule
in which everybody gets (1=n) of the original endowment as follows: the
divider gives up a fraction p (equal to his bid) of x that is equally shared
among the other agents.
As it turns out, there is a unique price p which makes every agent
indierent between the roles of divider and chooser. The procedure generates
a nal allocation that is ecient and egalitarian equivalent with respect to
the reference bundle formed by the union of a fraction (1=n) of the original
endowment and a fraction p of the numeraire bundle. Demange (1984)
improves on this scheme by proposing a version that avoids the infeasible
o-equilibrium allocations present in Crawford's (1979) procedure.
When viewed as an implementation result for their economic environ-
ment, these results exhibit a limitation. Although the choice of the nu-
meraire bundle aects the nal allocation, the procedure assumes that the
numeraire bundle is given exogenously, circumventing the problem of how
agents come to agree on it. Crawford (1979) points out that either plain
money or a bundle proportional to the total endowment are likely to be fo-
cal choices for the numeraire bundle. This latter choice denes the Pazner-
Schmeidler rule for the selection of the numeraire bundle, recently axioma-
6tized in Sprumont and Zhou (1999).
In our setup with just one heterogenous good, there is no money and
it is not clear how to dene a proportional bundle. Our contribution in
this section is to identify an economic environment where the denition of a
proportional bundle should be uncontroversial, making the use of the Pazner-
Schmeidler rule intuitively natural. We then extend the Crawford-Demange
procedure accordingly and provide a general method to achieve ecient and
egalitarian equivalent allocations for a single heterogeneous good.1
We enrich the setup in Section 2 with three assumptions, that dene the
economic environment investigated in this section.
(A1) There is a measure  on the measurable space (
;F).
(A2) For each i, the utility ui is absolutely continuous with respect to .
(A3) For each i, there exists a nite partition Pi = (pi
1;:::;pi
mi) such that,
if two parcels A;B satisfy A [ B  pi
j then
(A) = (B) ) ui(A) = ui(B)
Assumption (A1) requires that there is a common \objective" measure.
If 
 is a subset of Rk, this might be the Lebesgue measure. Assumption (A2)
requires that an agent attaches no utility to sets that have size zero, where
the size of a parcel is simply its -measure. Finally, Assumption (A3) states
that there is a partition Pi which divides 
 into mi parcels, each of which
can be considered a homogeneous good for agent i. Assumption (A3) can be
considerably relaxed by allowing Pi to be constituted by a countably innite
number of parcels. After few obvious modications, all of our results would
still hold. So it is only in the interest of simplicity that we assume that Pi
is nite.
An example may help to assess the import of these three assumptions.
Suppose that the object to be allocated is a chocolate chip cookie, which
we may think of as a subset of R3. Presumably, agents care only about the
cookie dough or the chocolate chips, although possibly in dierent guises.
Then (A1) is satised by taking  to be the Lebesgue measure on R3 and
(A2) holds for instance if agents attach no utility to morsels with empty
interior. Finally, (A3) is satised by assuming that each agent partitions the
cookie into two sets: the dough and the chips. From a technical viewpoint,
we note that, by the Radon-Nikodym Theorem, (A1){(A3) jointly state that
we can write the utility function of each agent i as ui(A) =
R
A fi d, where
fi is a nitely (or countably)-valued density.
While (A1) and (A3) may look restrictive when presented in an abstract
setting, we have not been able to nd applications in which it is not natural
1 In this respect, Demange (1984) suggests a lottery-based extension of the procedure,
but its demanding assumptions impose that agents be expected utility maximizers and
that the whole good be randomly assigned to a single agent o the equilibrium path.
7to assume that there is an objective way to measure 
 and that an agent
cares dierently about the parcels he gets in more than a nite (or countable)
number of ways. Even the standard example of an exchange economy with
a nite (or countable) number of homogeneous goods implicitly assumes
both (A1) and (A3); see Chambers (2005, Section 5). Sprumont (2004)
axiomatizes a closely related notion of cardinal commodities, and Section 6
comments more on the import of (A3). Assumption (A2) is a more technical
condition which we need only to ensure the eciency of a specic family of
allocations dened below; see footnote 2 below.
Any nite renement of Pi denes another partition that satises (A3).
Ordering such nite partitions by inclusion denes a lattice on the set of
partitions of 
. We denote by P1 _ P2 and P1 ^ P2 the common coarsening
and the common renement of two partitions P1 and P2, respectively.
For deniteness, we associate each agent i with an individual partition
Pc
i that is the common coarsening of all nite partitions that satisfy (A3).
Clearly, the individual partition Pc
i is the only partition among those satis-
fying (A3) for which any two parcels A  pi
j and B  pi
l (j 6= l) such that
(A) = (B) are associated with distinct utilities ui(A) 6= ui(B).
Consider now the common renement Pc =
V
i2N Pc
i of the individual
partitions for each agent, which we call the natural partition for 
. This
ner partition extends (A3) to all agents, in the sense that if two parcels
A;B satisfy A [ B  pj in Pc then
(A) = (B) ) ui(A) = ui(B) for all i in N. (1)
Therefore, the natural partition Pc of 
 divides the original heterogeneous
good in a nite set of parcels which each player views as homogeneous.
Clearly, any common renement of arbitrary partitions that satisfy (A3) for
all i leads to a common partition ner than Pc for which (1) still holds. The
natural partition Pc is simply the smallest one among those that satisfy (1):
focusing on it entails no loss of generality.
Let P = (p1;:::;pm) be the natural partition (or a renement of it).
Then each agent is indierent among morsels of equal size from a single
parcel pj and we can construct a bundle by adjoining proportional morsels
from each parcel of the natural partition. Formally speaking, a proportional
bundle of size  obtains if we choose  in [0;1] and then pick a morsel
ej from each parcel pj such that (ej) = (pj) for all j = 1;:::;m. The
proportional bundle is A =
Sm
j=1 ej. We do not need to specify how a morsel
ej is chosen from the parcel pj because, as far as its size (ej) = (pj),
each agent is indierent over the actual morsel chosen.
On the contrary, if we attempt the same construction using an arbitrary
partition P, morsels of equal size from the same parcel may carry dierent
utility for an agent. In general, we need to assume that P is (or renes) the
natural partition to ensure that the value of a proportional bundle of size 
8to each agent is independent of specic details in the choice of morsels. In
particular, this also makes it irrelevant to know the identity of the divider
who actually gets to choose the morsels from a parcel.
Suppose again that P = (p1;:::;pm) is the natural partition (or a re-
nement) and choose  in [0;1]. We can repeat the procedure n times and
construct n proportional bundles of size  by choosing (or instructing a di-
vider to choose) morsels of size (pj) from each parcel pj in P. If  = 1=n,
the divider can pick mutually exclusive morsels from each parcel that jointly
exhaust 
 (up to a -null set2). This generates an allocation that splits 

into n proportional bundles of equal size. Each agent is indierent among
any of these bundles of size 1=n. Hence, this allocation is proportional and
envy-free; however, in general it is not ecient.
If  > (1=n), the divider can still iterate the procedure and construct n
(overlapping) bundles of equal size . Since these are not mutually exclusive,
the resulting collection of equally sized parcels is not an allocation. More
generally, let P be the natural partition (or a renement) and suppose that
we are given weights 1;:::;n in [0;1]. We can repeat the procedure n
times, instructing a divider to choose at each stage k morsels of size k(pj)
from each parcel pj in P but, unless
P
i i = 1, this does not generate an
allocation.
The outcome of this construction is an (ordered) collection of n parcels
which have sizes proportional to a vector  = (1;:::;n) of positive weights.
Even when it is not an allocation, this collection associates each agent i with
a bundle of size i. We want to use the utility an agent receives from his
bundle as a benchmark for the utility he gets from a given allocation. Since
it is based on bundling proportionally-sized morsels from each parcel, we
call this collection of parcels a -proportional benchmark over the partition
P. When
P
i i = 1, we assume without loss of generality that the parcels
in the collection are mutually exclusive and we speak of a -proportional
benchmark allocation.
Whereas a proportional allocation must be feasible and make the utility
of each agent at least (1=n), a proportional benchmark requires only that the
size of the parcel associated with agent i is proportional to i. In general,
the agents' utility for a -proportional benchmark depends both on the
partition P used and on the details of the process. These details become
irrelevant | and hence can be ignored | when P is the natural partition
(or a renement).
The next section shows how to implement egalitarian equivalent alloca-
tions with respect to a reference parcel that is a proportional bundle of size
  1=n. Equivalently, for each agent the nal allocation generates the
same utility as a 1-proportional benchmark, where 1 denotes a vector
2 By (A2), a residual set of size zero carries no utility for any agent. From now on, we
assume without loss of generality that no residual set of size zero is left over.
9with all the components equal to . This is the case of interest when all
agents have equal claims on the good to be divided. The title of the next
section is a pun on similar titles in the literature.
5 How to cut a cookie fairly
We exhibit a procedure that implements an ecient and egalitarian equiv-
alent allocation when the object to be divided is a heterogeneous good that
is innitely divisible, in the setup of Section 2. The solution concept is
subgame perfection. Under a bland tie-breaking assumption, we show that
there are unique equilibrium payos, with a nal allocation that is ecient,
proportional and egalitarian equivalent. We assume complete information
about preferences, as well as (A1){(A3).
Our procedure is inspired by the mechanism described in Demange (1984)
to improve the version proposed in Crawford (1979). We have found a few
dierent game forms that do the job. The one presented here is especially
expedient because on the equilibrium path the only messages announced are
n bids (one for each agent), the nal allocation as chosen by an agent (called
divider), and n   1 \yes" from the remaining agents (called choosers) who
accept the divider's proposal; o the equilibrium path, the worst case has a
chooser saying \no", after which each agent announces a partition and the
nal allocation is a suitable proportional benchmark where each player picks
his own parcel. The procedure develops in two stages.
Stage 1. Each agent i in N simultaneously announces a bid bi between
1=n and 1. Agents are ordered by decreasing bids using if necessary an
exogenous (non-random) tie-breaking rule, so that b1  b2  :::  bn.
Agent 1 is called the divider, while any other agent is a chooser.
Stage 2. The last stage consists of n consecutive moves, one for each agent.
Move 0. The divider proposes an allocation X.
Move 1. Chooser n accepts or refuses. If he accepts, move 2 is played. If
he refuses, each agent i announces3 a partition Pi and the players select4
a proportional benchmark allocation Xn based on the common partition Vn
i=1 Pi and the vector of weights n dened below; then the game stops
and Xn is the nal allocation.
. . .
Move i + 1. Chooser n   i accepts or refuses. If he refuses, each agent i
announces a partition Pi and the players select a n i-proportional bench-
3 The timing of these announcements is irrelevant for the equilibrium outcome.
4 We assume that, using the pecking order dened below, each chooser sequentially
removes his own proportional bundle from 
; the divider gets what remains.
10mark allocation Xn i over the partition
Vn
i=1 Pi; then the game stops and
Xn i is the nal allocation. If he accepts, move i + 2 is played.
. . .
Move n   1. Chooser 2 accepts or refuses. If he refuses, each agent i
announces a partition Pi and the players select a 2-proportional benchmark
allocation X2 over the partition
Vn
i=1 Pi; then the game stops and X2 is the
nal allocation. If he accepts, the game stops and the nal allocation X is
the divider's proposal.
If agent i is the rst to refuse the divider's proposal, this aects the
choice of the vector i of convex weights used by the same agent i to pick
a proportional benchmark allocation. These vectors of convex weights are
dened hereafter.
Proportionality weights. To construct the vectors i (for i = 2;:::;n)
of proportionality coecients, we dene a pecking order for agents. Suppose
that players sit around a circle arranged in standard (clockwise) increasing
order. When i refuses, the circle is walked counterclockwise starting from i
and the pecking order is i < i   1 < ::: < 2 < n < n   1 < ::: < i + 1. Let
k(i) denote the k-th agent in this pecking order. We are ready to dene
the vector i = (i
1;:::;i
n) used if i refuses the proposed allocation. The
refusing agent i = 1(i) is assigned the proportionality coecient i
i = bi.















In other words, later choosers are assigned a proportionality coecient equal
to their bid when this is still a feasible convex weight, or otherwise its
truncation to 1. Whenever there is a refusal, the divider is assigned the
(same) coecient i
1 = max(0;1  
Pn
s=2 bs), regardless of the refuser i's
identity; for short, we denote this by 1. For each i, the positive weights
in i add up to 1, so that (up to a set of size zero, irrelevant by (A2)) the
i-proportional benchmark can also be made into an allocation exhausting
the whole good.
This concludes the description of the procedure. We prove two results
in this section. The rst one is that equilibrium allocations must be propor-
tional, in the sense that each agent receives a parcel which carries utility of
at least 1=n to him. The second and main result is that this procedure has
unique equilibrium payos and yields an allocation X that is ecient and
egalitarian equivalent.
We need a few denitions. Let A be the set of all possible allocations.
Given a partition P and a vector  of convex weights, let (jP) denote
11the set of {proportional benchmark allocations over P. Clearly, this set
contains (uncountably) many possible allocations. When P is the individual
partition Pc
i or any of its renements (such as the natural partition Pc), the
agent is indierent over any allocation in (jP) and thus his utility from
a -proportional benchmark allocation over P is well-dened.
Theorem 2 Any equilibrium allocation for the procedure described above is
proportional.
Proof: We prove the stronger statement that each agent has a strategy that
guarantees him the utility level  u = (1=n) associated with the proportional
benchmark allocation ( 1
n1jPc). This implies that in equilibrium an agent
must achieve at least utility  u = (1=n).
The strategy is the following. The agent bids (1=n) in the rst stage.
In the second stage, if he is the divider, he chooses the 1
n1-proportional
benchmark allocation over Pc
i ; if he is a chooser, he refuses any proposed
allocation; whenever asked for, he announces the partition Pc
i .
If the agent ends up being the divider and his proposal is accepted,
the nal allocation is in ( 1
n1jPc
i ) and his utility is  u = (1=n). If his




is not coarser than Pc
i and thus the nal allocation is in (jjPc
i ). But
j = 1
n1, because if the divider's bid is (1=n) all other bids are equal to
(1=n). Hence, the nal allocation is again in ( 1
n1jPc
i ) and the divider gets
utility  u = (1=n).
On the other hand, if the agent is chooser i, then every agent n;n  
1;:::;i + 1 before him in the pecking order has bid bj = (1=n). So, if a
chooser j = i;:::;n refuses, the vector j has 
j
k = (1=n) for k = i;:::;n.
Hence, if a refusal occurs up to (and including) i's move, the nal allocation
is in (jjPc
i ) which by a reasoning similar to the above yields utility  u =
(1=n) to agent i. 2
It is worth noting that the strategy discussed in the above proof requires
the agent to use and announce only information about his own preferences;
therefore, this strategy remains viable even when he has no information
about other agents' preferences. Hence, the ability of each agent to secure
a proportional allocation is a robust feature that does not depend on our
assumption of complete information.
The following is the main result in this section. Its proof, including a
few lemmata, can be found in the appendix. We assume that a chooser who
is indierent always prefers the move that keeps his play simpler and, sub-
ordinately, the move that ends the game sooner; for instance, a tie between
accepting or refusing a proposal is broken by accepting because this spares
him the need to announce a partition.
The statement uses the following piece of notation. Let (jPc) be
the set of {proportional benchmark allocations over the natural partition
12Pc (or a renement) and let i(jPc) denote the set of parcels that these
allocations may assign to agent i. As discussed above, ui[i(jPc)] is well-
dened. Finally, the equilibrium concept used is subgame perfection; for
short, we simply speak of \equilibrium".
Theorem 3 The procedure described above has unique equilibrium payos,
with nal allocations that are ecient and egalitarian equivalent. In every
equilibrium allocation, each agent i is indierent between the parcel he re-
ceives and getting i(1jPc), where  = maxf : there exists Y 2A with
ui(yi)  ui[i(1jPc)] for each ig.
The intuition for this result is the following. Our procedure asks each
player to sequentially approve the allocation decided by the divider. When
an allocation is not approved, each player i receives a proportional share
of (a common renement for) the partition he declares. The utility of this
proportional share depends on the partition used. However, by announcing
his own individual partition, the player can make sure that he receives the
same utility from his proportional share regardless of the common renement
that emerges from players' announcements. This sets a lower bound on the
utility that a player must receive from the procedure. In the rst stage,
when players bid for the right to be the divider, they know that they will
have to honor others' (credible) claims to these lower bounds out of their
own share. This forces a unique equilibrium bid corresponding to an ecient
and egalitarian equivalent allocation.
6 Closing remarks
It may be argued that our assumption (A3) is too restrictive, because it
transforms the original problem of dividing a heterogeneous good in a stan-
dard problem of dividing a nite (or countable) number of homogeneous
goods. We have two comments in this respect.
First, our aim is to show that the problem of dividing a single hetero-
geneous good can be assimilated to the problem of dividing a bundle of
homogeneous goods under assumptions that are not much demanding in
practical applications. When players can use the partitions of 
 as a strate-
gic variable, the complexity of their strategy space is humongous. However,
if preferences satises (A3), the equilibrium is relatively easy to characterize.
Second, the main contribution is to suggest a way to endogenize the
choice of the reference bundle that can be applied for the division of a bundle
of goods when agents disagree about which are the characteristics that dene
a homogeneous good. Suppose that a donor bequest his painting collection
to two museums, leaving to them the task of dividing the collection. In
order to do so, the museums would like to construct a reference bundle that
is a partition of the collection in homogeneous sets of works. A priori, there
13seems to be no \natural" way to construct this reference bundle. Should
paintings be deemed homogeneous with respect to the century when they
were painted, the nationality of the painters, or their artistic themes?
It seems only natural to let the museums decide the reference bundle
according to their preferences. Assuming equal rights, this paper describes
a mechanism that chooses this bundle endogenously. Each agent proposes
a partition of the total endowment and the reference bundle is obtained as
the common renement of individual proposals. In equilibrium, this selects
the natural partition (or a renement) as the reference bundle.
A Appendix
We recall and extend a piece of our notation to make the proofs in this ap-
pendix easier to read. Let (jP) denote the set of {proportional bench-
mark allocations over P and let i(jP) be the set of parcels that these
allocations may assign to agent i. Since i(jP) depends only on the i-th
component of , we abuse notation and write simply i(ijP) when we need
to highlight i's proportionality coecient. If P = Pc
i (or a renement,5
and in particular the natural partition Pc), the agent is indierent over any
element in this set and we denote his utility by vi(ijPc
i ) = ui[i(ijPc
i )].
By (A2) and the nonatomicity of ui, vi(ijPc
i ) is a strictly increasing
continuous function of i. We extend the function vi(ij) to an arbitrary
partition P by letting vi(ijP) = maxui[i(ijP)] be the maximum utility
that i can obtain by a parcel in i(ijP). (This maximum is well dened
because the partition range of u is compact.) In other words, vi(ijP) is
the maximum utility that an agent can get by any parcel associated with a
{proportional benchmark allocation over a partition P, when his propor-
tionality coecient if i.
We assume that a chooser who is indierent always prefers the move that
keeps his play simpler and, subordinately, the move that ends the game
sooner. Hence, when indierent, he chooses acceptance over refusing the
divider's proposal. When he is indierent between refusing now and having
some later chooser refuse, he prefers to refuse now.
The strategy of proof is the following. First, Lemmata 4{9 characterize
the subgame perfect equilibrium where each agent announces Pc in any
continuation game after a refusal. Second, Lemma 10 shows that the payo
generated by this equilibrium are ecient. Finally, Lemma 11 proves that
there may not be other equilibrium payos.
In general, there are many equilibrium strategies that may be used in
a continuation game after a refusal. The requirement that everybody an-
nounces Pc in any continuation game is very strong, but we show later that
5 For simplicity, we leave it understood in the following that P
c
i may be replaced by
any of its renements.
14any other equilibrium must achieve the same payos. The technical ad-
vantage of this assumption is apparent: when another player declares the
partition Pc, the common partition to be used in the second stage is a re-
nement of Pc
i ; hence, any partition announced by agent i himself is payo
equivalent and thus is part of an equilibrium.
Lemma 4 Assume that the common partition in any continuation game
after a refusal is Pc. Then a proposed allocation X is accepted if and only
if ui(xi)  vi(bijPc) for each i  2.
Proof: The proof is by backwards induction. Suppose that the game has
reached agent 2. Then he can accept x2 or choose a 2-proportional bench-
mark allocation X2 over the partition Pc. By our tie-breaking rule, he
accepts if and only if u2(x2)  v2(b2jPc). Anticipating this, if 2 is going to
accept, then agent 3 accepts x3 if and only if u3(x3)  v3(b3jPc). The result
follows by induction. 2
Lemma 5 Assume that the common partition in any continuation game
after a refusal is Pc. If the proposed allocation X is refused, the nal allo-
cation is a n-proportional benchmark Xn chosen by player n (who moves
second).
Proof: Suppose that X is not accepted and let i be the smallest index in
f2;:::;ng such that ui(xi) < vi(bijPc). By Lemma 4, i refuses X if the game
reaches him. Anticipating this, agent i + 1 (if any) has a choice between
getting a proportional bundle of size i
i+1 over the partition Pc (if he accepts
and lets the game reach i) or a proportional bundle of size bi+1 over the same
partition Pc (if he refuses). But i
i+1  bi+1, so the rst option can never
lead to a higher utility for i + 1. Therefore, by our tie-breaking rule, he
prefers to stop the game. The result follows by induction. 2
The next two lemmata describe the optimal strategy for the divider,
given a vector b = (b1;:::;bn) = (b1;b 1) of bids from the rst stage.
Whenever there is a refusal, the proportionality coecient for the divider is
1 = max(0;1  
Pn
s=2 bs), regardless of the refuser i's identity. Since the
common partition after a refusal is Pc, the divider's utility is v1(1jPc). On
the other hand, by Lemma 4, the allocation X is accepted if and only if
ui(xi)  vi(bijPc) for every i  2. Let
A(b 1) = fX2A : ui(xi)  vi(bijPc) for each i  2g
be the set of allocations which are accepted.
Lemma 6 Assume that the common partition in any continuation game
after a refusal is Pc. For any b 1 such that A(b 1) 6= ; there exists an al-
location which maximizes u1(x1). A maximizing allocation X(b 1) satises
ui(x
i) = vi(bijPc) for each i  2.
15Proof: Let S(b 1) = [0;1][v2(b2jPc);1][vn(bnjPc);1] denote the carte-
sian product of n intervals. This is a compact and convex subset of Rn.
Similarly, the partition range RP(u), which spans the vector of utilities that
the agents can achieve under a feasible allocation, is a nonempty, compact
and convex subset of Rn.
When A(b 1) 6= ;, there exists at least one allocation which maps to a
vector of utilities in S(b 1). Hence, the intersection of RP(u) and S(b 1)
is not empty. As this intersection is also compact (and convex), there exists
(at least) an allocation X(b 1) which maximizes u1(x1).
Now, suppose that at X there is some i  2 such that ui(x
i) > vi(bijPc).
By the nonatomicity of ui, we can always cut away a morsel from x
i and
reduce the utility of i down to vi(bijPc), transferring the morsel to agent 1's
parcel. By mutual absolute continuity of preferences, this strictly increases
the utility of agent 1 and therefore X cannot be optimal. Therefore, at an
optimal allocation X, the equality ui(x
i) = vi(bijPc) must hold for each
i  2. 2
Given b 1, the divider faces the choice of selecting an allocation which
is accepted by everybody or another allocation which is eventually refused.
In this second case, the common partition after a refusal is Pc and then
his utility is v1(1jPc). Clearly, if A(b 1) = ;, there exists no acceptable
allocation X so the divider ends up with v1(1jPc). Instead, if A(b 1) 6= ;,
he proposes X(b 1) if and only if u1(x
1)  v1(1jPc). The next lemma
summarizes this. Let f(b 1) = maxfu1(x1) : X2A(b 1)g, with the usual
clause that f(b 1) =  1 if A(b 1) = ;. By Lemma 6, this is well-dened
and moreover, on A(b 1) 6= ;,
f(b 1) = maxfu1(x1) : X2A and ui(xi) = vi(bijPc) for each i  2g: (3)
Lemma 7 Assume that the common partition in any continuation game
after a refusal is Pc. For any b 1, agent 1 proposes an acceptable allocation
X(b 1) and the vector of nal equilibrium payos is
(f(b 1);v2(b2jPc);:::;vn(bnjPc))
if and only if f(b 1)  v1(1jPc). Otherwise, agent 1's proposal is refused





i  bi for each i  2.
The next lemma notes two useful properties for f(b 1).
Lemma 8 Let D be the interior set of fb 1 : A(b 1) 6= ;g. The function
f(b 1) is (component-wise) strictly decreasing and continuous on D.
16Proof: By denition, f(b 1)  0 on D. Recall that vi(bijPc) is a strictly
increasing and continuous function of bi for each i. By strict monotonicity,
bi < b0
i for some i  2 implies vi(bijPc) < vi(b0
ijPc). If (b2;:::;bi :::;bn)
and (b2;:::;b0
i :::;bn) are in D, by (3) and mutual absolute continuity of
preferences, f(b2;:::;bi :::;bn) > f(b2;:::;b0
i :::;bn).
To prove continuity, let u = (u1;:::;un) denote a vector of utilities for
each player and observe that
f(b 1) = maxfu1 : u2RP(u) and ui = vi(bijPc) for each i  2g:
For b 1 in D, let  (b 1) = fu2RP(u) : ui = vi(bijPc) for each i  2g
be the correspondence mapping b 1 into RP(u). Since RP(u) is nonempty,
compact and convex, the continuity of each vi implies that  (b 1) is compact-
valued and continuous. Hence, by the Maximum theorem, the function
f(b 1) = maxfu1 : u2 (b 1)g is continuous. 2
The next lemma pins down equilibrium behavior in the rst stage.
Lemma 9 Assume that the common partition in any continuation game
after a refusal is Pc. The only possible equilibrium move in the rst stage
is that everyone makes the same bid
b = max

 : X2A and ui(xi)  vi(jPc) for each i
	
:
Proof: First, we show that b is well-dened. Let n
i=1[vi(jPc);1] be the
cartesian product of the n intervals [vi(jPc);1], for i = 1;:::;n. For any
 in [1=n;1], let C() = n
i=1 [vi(jPc);1]
T
RP(u). By the proof of Theo-
rem 2, C(1=n) 6= ;. Moreover, 1 > 2 implies C(1)  C(2). Since C()
is a decreasing collection of nested compact subsets, the nite intersection
property implies that, for  = supf : C() 6= ;g, C() 6= ;. Clearly, 
is equal to b.
Second, we show that if everybody bids b then the divider proposes
an acceptable allocation. By Lemma 7, the divider does so if and only
if f(b 1)  v1(1jPc). By Theorem 2, f(b 1)  v1(1=njPc). Moreover,
1  1=n and v1(jPc) is an increasing function, so f(b 1)  v1(1=njPc) 
v1(1jPc).
Third, we show that an equilibrium move in the rst stage cannot have
bi < b1 for some i. Since b1  bi for each i by construction, this implies that
the equilibrium bids must all be equal. Indeed, suppose bi < b1 for some i.
There are two cases. If 1 > 0, then 1   1 =
Pn
i=2 bi < 1. By choosing
a bid b0
i such that bi < b0
i < b1 and b0
i +
P
j6=1;i bj < 1, i remains chooser
and strictly increases his payo to vi(b0
ijPc). If 1 = 0, the inequality in the
paragraph above strengthens to f(b 1)  v1(1=njPc) > v1(1jPc) by the
strict monotonicity of v1. Then b 1 is in D and by Lemma 8 agent i can
nd a bid b0
i with bi < b0
i < b1 and f(b2;:::;b0
i :::;bn) > v1(1jPc). The
17divider is still agent 1 who chooses an acceptable allocation, which strictly
increases i's payo to vi(b0
ijPc). In either case, bi is not a best reply.
The last paragraph implies that in equilibrium all bids are equal to a com-
mon value b. We now prove that b = b. Let wi(b) = maxfui(xi) : X2A
and uj(xj)  vj(bjPc) for j 6= ig. In other words, let wi(b) be the payo
to i if he is the divider and everybody has made the same bid b. Clearly,
wi(b) < vi(bjPc) if and only if b > b. Suppose that the common equilibrium
bid is b < b. By the continuity of wi, chooser i can slightly raise his bid
to b0 and become the divider, which gets him a payo wi(b0) > vi(bjPc) so
that b is not a best reply. Now, suppose that the common equilibrium bid is
b > b. Then the divider's payo is w1(b) < v1(bjPc). Again, by continuity
of w1, he can slightly lower his bid to b0 and become a chooser, which gets
him a payo v1(b0) > w1(bjPc) so that b is not a best reply. Hence, the only
possible equilibrium must have everybody bidding b. Using Lemma 6 and
the fact that wi(b) < vi(bjPc) if and only if b > b, it follows that when
everybody bids b each agent i (regardless of his role as divider or chooser)
receives a payo vi(bjPc) and thus he is indierent between the two roles.
Therefore, everybody bidding b is the (only) equilibrium. 2
This completes our characterization of the equilibrium. In fact, we have
shown a bit more. Since Lemmata 4{9 hold for any equilibrium where the
common partition in any continuation game after a refusal is Pc, we know
that the equilibrium payo of player i is vi(bjPc) for this whole class of
equilibria. The next lemma shows that these payos are ecient.
Lemma 10 Assume that the common partition in any continuation game
after a refusal is Pc. Then the only possible equilibrium outcome is ecient.
Proof: The proof of Lemma 9 shows that the divider proposes an acceptable
allocation that satises (3). 2
The next lemma exploits the eciency of this equilibrium outcome to
prove that there are no other equilibrium outcomes. The key observation is
that each player alone can enforce the common partition Pc. Hence, each
player k holds a form of veto power on the common partition used after a
refusal from another agent. A second observation is that Theorem 2 implies
that each player can secure a utility level  u = (1=n) > 0; hence, in any
equilibrium the divider cannot have zero utility.
Lemma 11 The equilibrium payos are unique, regardless of how the con-
tinuation game after a refusal is played.
Proof: Suppose that there exists another putative equilibrium E that is not
payo equivalent. Let u
i = vi(bjPc) be the payo obtained by player i in
any equilibrium where the common partition in any continuation game after
a refusal is Pc. Since E is not payo equivalent to an ecient equilibrium,
18there exists some player k who obtains a utility uk < u
k. We show that this
must lead to a contradiction. There are three distinct cases to examine.
Case 1. Suppose bi  b for all i. If player k is getting utility uk < u
k,
there exists " > 0 such that uk < vk(b   "jPc) < u
k. Then player k has a
protable deviation: bid b " in stage 1, reject any proposal in stage 2 and,
in case of refusal, announce the natural partition Pc. This makes player k
the rst chooser and gives him a utility vk(b   "jPc) > uk.
Case 2. Suppose bi  b for all i. Again, player k has a protable deviation:
bid bk > b in stage 1, propose an appropriate allocation that give each agent
i 6= k a utility u
i and announce Pc in case of refusal. Since this higher bid
gives k the right to be divider and indierent choosers prefer to accept, any
allocation that satises (3) gives him a utility u
k > uk.
Case 3. Suppose b1 > b > bn. Similarly to the third part of the proof
of Lemma 9, we show that this cannot be an equilibrium. Given the tie-
breaking order b1  b   2  :::  bn, let m be the rst agent who has bid
bn. (If only one agent has bid bn, then clearly m = n.)
First, assume that in equilibrium the allocation proposed by the divider
is accepted. Clearly, chooser m must get at least vm(bmjPc); otherwise, he
could protably deviate to refusing and announcing Pc. On the other hand,
by mutual absolute continuity of preferences, player m gets no more than
vm(bmjPc); otherwise, the divider could increase his own payo by appropri-
ating a morsel from m's parcel, reducing his utility exactly to vm(bmjPc) and
announcing Pc in case of refusal. By Theorem 2, the divider has a strictly
positive utility in equilibrium and therefore is left with a parcel from which
m can claim an additional morsel. In fact, there is a suciently small " > 0
such that player m can protably deviate to a higher bid bm + " < bm 1,
announcing Pc in case of refusal. If m = n, the player remains the rst
chooser and is guaranteed a utility vm(bm + "jPc) > vm(bmjPc). If m < n
and " is suciently small, there still exists an ecient allocation that is
accepted by all choosers so the divider's best reply is to make a proposal
that is not rejected.
Second, assume that in equilibrium the allocation proposed by the di-
vider 1 is refused. Again, by Theorem 2, the divider has a strictly positive
utility in equilibrium and therefore is left with a parcel from which m can
claim an additional morsel by deviating to a higher bid bm + " < bm 1 and
announcing Pc in case of refusal. 2
The proof of the main result follows.
Proof of Theorem 3. Lemma 11 shows that equilibrium payos are unique.
Lemma 10 and Lemma 9 prove that the equilibrium outcome is ecient
and egalitarian equivalent, respectively. The proof of Lemma 9 also shows
that each agent i is indierent between the parcel received and the 1-
proportional benchmark allocation. 2
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